Rear Admiral DOORMAN'S reason for stationing the U.S. destroyers astern was due to their inferior gun and superior torpedo armament. Four funnel SENDAI class cruiser referred to in para. By this time the remainder of the Allied squadron, which, with the exception of the "KORTENAER", appeared to have suffered little if any damage, was steering to the Eastward firing intermittently and EXETER" gradually shaped course for SOURABAYA. Firing on both sides was necessarily intermittent, targets being engaged by "EXETER" whenever seen clear of smoke, and it was seldom that it was possible to spot on more than four to five salvos. 11in hit and “Achilles” already had splinter damage. On completion, Exeter joined the 2nd Cruiser Squadron with the Atlantic Fleet, where she served during 1931/35. Light was failing and the time must have been about 1830. Captain, Royal Navy. Their effective smoke laying was undoubtedly of great value. Reload time - 12.0 s. 180 degree turn time - 22.5 s. Maximum dispersion - 131 м. Ratings comprising the steaming watch in B Boiler room. A 3D map showing the seabed site of HMS Exeter after the ship had been removed A 100m destroyer, HMS Electra, had also been scavenged, the report found, although a … 3. No receipt was received from the above station who was calling H.M.S. The second four funnel cruiser engaged turned away under smoke after about 10 salvos and was momentarily re-engaged when again seen clear of her own smoke after having made a turn of some 180 degrees. (b) Main armament and control out of action. Three days later this ship proceeded to MACASSAR where all prisoners on board her were transferred on 10th March to the Dutch military barracks which had been turned into a P.O.W. (a) Main engines stopped and all power in the ship failed or failing (one dynamo was kept running until steam also failed to this). A 1900 lb projectile from the USS New Jersey's 16" Mark 7 gun, was found and eliminated by the … The range was about 16,000 yards and after a few salvos the enemy turned away to the northwards under smoke. 7. It was unfortunate that "EXETER's" Walrus aircraft was unserviceable as the result of blast damage sustained during frequent enemy air attacks. Rotation Speed 8 deg./sec. Exeter May have been sunk if … 43. No report from the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. All Out Assault CN: 全弹发射 (iii) Damage to enemy aircraft. Initial reduction of speed to 11 knots with a subsequent maximum of 15 to 16 knots. All rafts, float-a-nets and available woodwork were thrown overboard and good use was subsequently made of these. Maximum HE shell damage – 2850. The ship quickly righted, rolled over to starboard and sank at about 1150 in some 30 fathoms in very approximate position 04 degrees 38 minutes South, 112 degrees 28 minutes EAST. See TNA CAB 66/4/47 (ii) This action demonstrated in a very marked manner the difficulty of working with a heterogeneous squadron composed of ships of different nationalities all of whose methods, but in particular those of signalling and fire distribution, differ from our own and with whom there had been no opportunity of even the briefest discussion on such matters. If you can see this text here you should update to a newer web browser. I endeavoured to do so myself in the hope that "DE RUYTER" would conform but this hope did not materialise. GORDON, Throughout this final action both "ENCOUNTER" and "POPE" were well handled and well fought. These appeared to be two merchant ships escorted by a cruiser or destroyer. 3. The enemy appeared to be unaffected by this attack. After clearing the minefields the force assumed the cruising order previously arranged namely; Cruisers in single line, British and Dutch destroyers screening ahead and U.S. destroyers forming a separate unit astern. The names of those killed were reported by signal after arrival at SOURABAYA. "ENCOUNTER" and "POPE" engaged the two leading destroyers. After clearing SOURABAYA minefields the destroyers were ordered to take up screening diagram Number 2A and shortly before midnight steam was available in the two additional boilers. Sir, Record Group 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII War Diaries. Telegraphist NEWMAN, in charge of "EXETERS" W/T department, may throw some light on the difficulties of enemy reporting in this area at this time. The first part of the night 28/lst passed without incident. Two or three minutes later we were in battle for at 0618 Graf Spee opened fire on Exeter at about 20,000 yards with her main armament of eleven inch guns. Almost simultaneously two more large cruisers were sighted bearing approximately 330 degrees and these at once turned towards. 41. HMS Exeter (68) was a York-class heavy cruiser of the Royal Navy that served in World War II. One minute later, when HMS Exeter had fired eight salvoes, another 11” shell knocked out her ‘B’ turret. SOURCE: Exeter were killed by splinters ricocheting under the side of the bridge roof. These were identified as the topmasts of warships, cruisers or larger, steering to the N.N.E. "EXETER" under my command on the latter date. Air reports were of considerable assistance in the latter part of the action. Rear Admiral DOORMAN had called a meeting of Commanding Officers for 1700 but no information of this was received until nearly that time when the British Liaison Officer attached to "DE RUYTER" arrived onboard "EXETER". It was kncwn that no support from surface forces could be expected, and it was believed that the Allied air forces would be fully employed against the Japanese invaders. "ENCOUNTER" followed suit and, conditions for smoke being good, the resulting smoke screens were decidedly effective. While accurate records are not available it can be stated that slightly over one third main armament outfit was expended during the action and also a small amount of A/A ammunition. The fire of the enemy’s 11 inch guns at a range of 13 miles was very accurate; this emphasises the necessity of zigzagging (speed permitting) to throw out the enemy’s ranged plot. It was about this time, or shortly before, that further masts were sighted to the N.N.E. in. By dusk of 1st March 1942 the survivors from all three ships, spread out miles apart, were clinging to wreckage in the waters of the Java Sea. 19. This signal is believed to have been the result of a decision made at BANDOENG, since I had, in telephonic conversation with Rear Admiral PALLISER that morning from the Dutch naval headquarters, been warned to be prepared for such orders in spite of the fact that, at the time, six of "EXETER"'s eight boilers were out of action. document.write("